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Abstract 
 
Logbooks and sea charts may appear as rather straightforward evidence to present at a naval 
court martial. However, their introduction into proceedings in the early nineteenth century 
reveals an important shift. Measuring the depth of water soon became a problem of both 
navigation and of discipline. Indeed, Captain Newcomb’s knowledge of the soundings taken 
at the Battle of the Basque Roads proved crucial at Lord Gambier’s court martial in June 
1809. Through a case study of Edward Massey’s sounding machine, this paper reveals the 
close connection between disciplinary practices on land and at sea. The Board of Longitude 
acted as a key intermediary in this respect. By studying land and sea together, this paper 
better explains the changing make-up of the British scientific instrument trade in this period. 
Massey is just one example of a range of new entrants, many of whom had little previous 
experience of the maritime world. More broadly, this paper emphasises the role of both 
environmental history and material culture in the study of scientific instruments. 
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Introduction 
‘Could you, as far as your information of the depth of water enabled you to judge, have got 
near enough to those ships to have destroyed them?’1 It was on this question that the court 
martial of Lord Gambier depended. He was accused of failing to follow up an attack on the 
French fleet at the Battle of the Basque Roads in 1809. A number of French ships had run 
ashore and Gambier feared for the safety of the British fleet in following them too close to the 
shoals, HMS Imperieuse having run aground on the night of 12th April.2 This episode neatly 
demonstrates how the measurement of depth concerned not just navigation but also 
discipline: it was a means by which to assess negligence and instil obedience. Around this 
time, the character of discipline within the Royal Navy also underwent significant changes. 
Fear of punishment, the Admiralty felt, no longer acted as a sufficient deterrent. Despite the 
liberal application of the gallows following the mutinies of 1797, naval unrest continued 
throughout the Napoleonic Wars.3 Political pressure favoured a shift in approach: one in 
which discipline relied, not on the fear of punishment, but on the control of work.4 Previous 
histories of depth sounding have tended to concentrate on the second half of the nineteenth 
century, during which the economics of seabed telegraphy play a key role.5 In contrast, this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 William Gurney, Minutes of a Court Martial Holden on Board His Majesty’s Ship Gladiator, Portsmouth: Mottley, 
Harrison and Miller, 1809, p. 198. 
2 Gurney, op. cit. (1), p. 84. 
3 John Byrn, Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy: Discipline on the Leeward Islands Station 1784-1812, Aldershot: 
Scolar Press, 1989, p. 3. 
4 William Ashworth, ‘‘System of Terror’: Samuel Bentham, Accountability and Dockyard Reform during the 
Napoleonic Wars’, Social History (1998) 23, p. 64. 
5 Richard Dunn, ‘‘Their brains over-taxed’: Ships, Instruments and Users’, in Richard Dunn and Don Leggett, 
(eds.), Re-inventing the Ship: Science, Technology and the Maritime World, 1800-1918, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012 
and Helen Rozwadowski, Fathoming the Ocean: the Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea, London: Harvard 
University Press, 2005, p. 86. 
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paper reveals the relationship between work-discipline and the early introduction of 
mechanical depth sounding technology.6 
For much of history, the depth of the sea had been measured using lead and line. 
However, in 1802 the Staffordshire clockmaker Edward Massey patented a brass device he 
referred to as a ‘sounding machine’, an example of which sits in the Whipple Museum, 
Cambridge, UK (Figure 1).7 This machine was designed to be attached to a standard lead 
and line and thrown overboard.8 It consisted of a rotor which, when descending to the 
seabed, turned a perpetual screw connected to two numbered dials. One dial recorded 
intervals from 0 to 10 fathoms, the other from 0 to 150 fathoms. It also featured a 
mechanism, activated on striking the seabed, which locked the dials on hauling the machine 
in. Whilst not the first mechanical sounding design, Massey’s was the first to be widely 
adopted by the Royal Navy. In 1807, on the recommendation of the Board of Longitude, the 
Navy Board ordered 500 of Massey’s machines followed by another 1250 between 1808 and 
1811. This equates to at least one machine for every Royal Navy ship in commission during 
the Napoleonic Wars.9  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For the relationship between astronomy and discipline, see Simon Schaffer, ‘Astronomers Mark Time: 
Discipline and the Personal Equation’, Science in Context (1988) 2, pp. 101-131. 
7 Wh.2970, Edward Massey’s Sounding Machine, Whipple Museum of the History of Science, University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK (henceforth Wh.2970). Other examples consulted for this paper include 
NAV0673, Sounding Machine, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK and 1874-68, Hand Lead 
and Deep Sea Sounding Machine, The Science Museum, London, UK. 
8 The Board of Longitude referred to a range of navigational equipment as ‘machines’, a fluid label in this 
period. For the long history of related terminology, see Deborah Warner, ‘What is a Scientific 
Instrument, When Did it Become One, and Why?’, British Journal for the History of Science (1990) 23, pp. 
279-305. 
9 Anita McConnell, No Sea Too Deep: The History of Oceanographic Instruments, Bristol: Hilger, 1982, p. 28. 
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Figure 1: Edward Massey’s sounding machine, Wh.2970, Whipple Museum, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Through a case study of this object, I argue that the developing system of discipline 
comprised three interrelated elements: individual accountability, visibility and divisions of 
labour. In making this argument, I develop two broader themes within the history of 
instrumentation.  
Firstly, I suggest that there is much to be gained by paying greater attention to the 
relationship between practices on land and sea.10 The early nineteenth century witnessed an 
unprecedented flow of men and machines between artisanal workshops, dockyards and the 
ocean. The new system of discipline itself was to operate continuously, whether enacted in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 David Lambert, Luciana Martins and Miles Ogborn, ‘Currents, Visions, and Voyages: Historical 
Geographies of the Sea’, Journal of Historical Geography (2006) 32, p. 485. 
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naval dockyard or on board a ship stationed in the West Indies.11 This turned out to be more 
difficult than the Admiralty might have hoped. The maritime environment in particular 
presented distinct challenges. To appreciate this, we need to remember that the museum is a 
misleadingly placid environment (stationary, well-lit, free from noise or moisture). Such an 
arrangement shrouds the circumstances in which navigational instruments were most often 
relied upon. Sounding is a case in point. In foul weather and low light, it was often the only 
means by which a navigator could determine the position of their ship at sea. Within around 
100 miles of land, the depth of water could, in principle, be plotted against common charts in 
order to determine a ship’s position.12 Errors or insubordination could prove fatal. Histories 
of scientific instruments therefore need to be grounded in environmental history just as much 
as material culture.13 By taking seriously these conditions I am able to demonstrate how noise, 
light and weather all mediated the relationship between instrument makers on land and a 
new disciplinary regime at sea.14 
Secondly, by treating land and sea within the same frame, this paper better explains 
more general changes taking place within the British scientific instrument trade at this time.15 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Maria Bentham, The Life of Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Bentham, K.S.G, London: Longman, Green, Longman 
and Roberts, 1862, p. 251. 
12 On the problems associated with producing accurate hydrographic charts in this period, see James Davey, 
‘The Advancement of Nautical Knowledge: the Hydrographical Office, the Royal Navy and the 
Charting of the Baltic Sea, 1795–1815’, The Journal of Maritime Research (2011) 13, pp. 81-103. 
13 John Law’s attention to the wind and currents between Portugal and the Canary Islands is exemplary in this 
respect, see John Law, ‘On the Social Explanation of Technical Change: the Case of the Portuguese 
Maritime Expansion’, Technology and Culture (1987) 28, p. 236. 
14 On the importance of material culture in maritime history, see Richard Dunn, ‘Material Culture in the 
History of Science: Case Studies from the National Maritime Museum’, The British Journal for the History of 
Science (2009) 42, pp. 31-33. 
15 These changes are typically explained in terms of processes taking place solely on land, such as education or 
industrialisation, see Roger Anderson, ‘Were Scientific Instruments in the Nineteenth Century 
Different?’, in Peter de Clercq (ed.), Nineteenth-Century Scientific Instruments and their Makers, Leiden: Museum 
Boerhaave, 1985, p. 3 and Alison Morrison-Low, Making Scientific Instruments in the Industrial Revolution, 
Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007. 
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The ‘small world’ of the ship cannot be separated from the big world beyond.16 The Board of 
Longitude is an important institution in this respect. Founded by an Act of Parliament in 
1714, it was initially charged with assessing proposals for accurately measuring longitude at 
sea. But towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Board of Longitude’s remit was 
considerably expanded. A series of Acts of Parliament passed between 1769 and 1796 
provided rewards for ‘other Useful Discoveries and Improvements in Navigation’.17 The 
Board of Longitude then emerged as an institutional link between a range of artisans on land 
and sailors at sea. Massey was just one of hundreds of craftsmen, many of whom had never 
stepped foot aboard a ship, seeking the Board of Longitude’s patronage. These were men like 
Henry Jennings, a London chemist and inventor of an improved ‘half-minute glass’, Robert 
Raines-Baines, a glass worker from Hull and manufacturer of a ‘sea perambulator’, and 
Segismund Rentzsch, a London watchmaker who proposed an ‘instrument for measuring 
time by a current of air’.18 These men, unlike eighteenth-century instrument makers such as 
James Short, were not in a position to solicit the interest of the Philosophical Transactions. 
Instead, they discussed and promoted their designs in the new journals of natural philosophy 
alongside mechanics’ magazines.19 
For all these craftsmen, times were tough. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
a combination of excise duties, free trade and the erosion of statutory apprenticeships put !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Helen Rozwadowski, ‘Small World: Forging a Scientific Maritime Culture for Oceanography’, Isis (1996) 87. 
17 Sophie Waring, ‘The Board of Longitude and the Funding of Scientific Work: Negotiating Authority and 
Expertise in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Journal for Maritime Research (2014) 16, p. 58 and Derek 
Howse, ‘Britain’s Board of Longitude: The Finances, 1714-1828’, The Mariner’s Mirror (1998) 84, pp. 415-
416. 
18 RGO 14/31, Pamphlet Concerning Raines-Baines’s Sea Perambulator, Royal Greenwich Observatory 
Archives, Cambridge University Library, UK (henceforth Royal Greenwich Observatory Archives), 
RGO 14/31, Mr Jennings's Observations Upon the New Invented Log, or Half-Minute Glass, Royal 
Greenwich Observatory Archives, and RGO 14/24, Segismund Rentzsch to the Board of Longitude, 
June 1813, Royal Greenwich Observatory Archives. 
19 Jim Bennett, ‘Instrument Makers and the ‘Decline of Science in England’: the Effect of Institutional Change 
on the Elite Makers of the Early Nineteenth Century’, in Peter de Clercq (ed.), Nineteenth-Century Scientific 
Instruments and their Makers, Leiden: Museum Boerhaave, 1985, p. 18. 
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pressure on artisans, particularly watchmakers, to generate alternative sources of income.20 
Massey was no exception. His contact with the Board of Longitude is interspersed with 
unsuccessful petitions regarding designs for improved escapement mechanisms.21 And whilst 
Massey completed a watchmaking apprenticeship under his father in the late eighteenth 
century, by the end of his life he listed his profession as a ‘nautical instrument maker’.22 
Early nineteenth-century navigational practices at sea therefore cannot be understood 
as distinct from social and institutional changes taking place on land.23 The new disciplinary 
regime I identify was part of a much wider transformation in attitudes towards the 
management of labour extending well beyond the Royal Navy.24 Additionally, whilst the 
history of navigation in the eighteenth century centres on changes in astronomical practice 
alongside the development of marine timekeepers, early nineteenth-century artisans 
reconfigured much more basic navigational tools: the lead, the log, and the compass.25 Sailors 
and officers now struggled with an array of new instruments, inspired by a diversity of trades, 
from watchmakers to chemists. At the same time, these artisans constituted an emerging 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Keith Snell, ‘The Apprenticeship System in British History: the Fragmentation of a Cultural Institution’, 
History of Education (1996) 25, pp. 303-304 and Edward Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and 
Industrial Capitalism’, Past & Present (1967) 38, p. 66. 
21 RGO 14/7, Confirmed Minutes, 1 December 1814, Royal Greenwich Observatory Archives. 
22 Alan Treherne, ‘Massey Family (per. c.1760–1891),’ in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, (Online Edition), 2004 and Class: HO107, Piece: 1519, Folio: 409, Page: 25, GSU roll: 
87853, Goswell Street, Clerkenwell, Middlesex, Census Returns of England and Wales, 1851, National 
Archives, Surrey, UK. 
23 For more general histories of the relationship between land and maritime communities, see Peter Linebaugh 
and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the 
Revolutionary Atlantic and Richard Drayton, ‘Maritime Networks and Making Knowledge’, in David 
Cannadine (ed.), Empire, the Sea and Global History: Britain’s Maritime World, 1763-1840, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
24 These are best described by Raphael Samuel, ‘Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology 
in Mid-Victorian Britain,’ History Workshop Journal (1977) 3. 
25 Simon Schaffer, ‘Swedenborg’s Lunars’, Annals of Science (2013) 71 and Jim Bennett, ‘The Travels and Trials of 
Mr Harrison’s Timekeeper,’ in Marie Bourguet, Christian Licoppe, and H. Otto Sibum (eds.), Instruments, 
Travel and Science: Itineraries of Precision from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, 2002. 
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group of nautical instrument makers, often with little previous experience of the maritime 
world. Massey’s sounding machine is just one example of this much wider trend. 
 
Sounding in silence 
Samuel Bentham, younger brother of Jeremy, understood well both the importance and 
difficulty of taking accurate soundings. Whilst apprenticed to a Master Shipwright at 
Chatham Dockyard in the 1770s, Bentham spent his free time sailing in the English Channel, 
a stretch of water which could prove treacherous without precise knowledge of the depth of 
water. When not at sea, Bentham worked in the dockyard repairing those ships which had 
not been so careful.26 In landlocked Staffordshire, Massey’s boyhood experience of the sea, or 
lack thereof, could not have been more different. What he did know about maritime practice 
he learned from reading The British Mariner’s Guide.27 And it was the local canal, rather than 
the open sea, which provided the initial testing ground for Massey’s early designs.28 
Despite their varying experiences both Massey and Bentham were soon engaged in 
the Admiralty’s broader vision to reform naval discipline. Following his return from a tour of 
the continental dockyards, Bentham was appointed to the new position of Inspector General 
of Naval Works in 1796. There he began to emphasise the importance of individual 
accountability for naval discipline. He claimed that, because naval practices were based on 
collective responsibility, there was a tendency to ‘find excuses for even the greatest 
mismanagement or abuse’. With this in mind, Bentham instigated a number of reforms in the 
dockyards designed to restore order. Principally, he made dockyard officers, rather than 
groups of workers, directly responsible for specific tasks, such as the sawing or veneering: if 
something went wrong, an individual would have to take the blame. This disrupted the ease !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Maria Bentham, ‘Memoirs of late Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Bentham’, in Papers and Practical Illustrations of 
Public Works of Recent Construction, London: John Weale, 1856, pp. 42-43. 
27 RGO 14/31, Edward Massey to the Board of Longitude, 11 September 1807, Royal Greenwich Observatory 
Archives. 
28 Rupert Simms, Bibliotheca Staffordiensis, Lichfield: Lomax, 1894, p. 303. 
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of collective disobedience.29 Still, the Admiralty was concerned that ill-discipline might spread 
between the dockyard and the sea. Given the traffic of men between the two, this was not 
unreasonable. Reports in 1801 that artificers in Plymouth had been coordinating strike action 
with sailors aboard ships in the harbour seemed to confirm these fears.30 In response, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, also a de facto Commissioner of the Board of Longitude, demanded a 
system of ‘military discipline’ which could be applied equally to ‘seaman’ and ‘the civil branch 
of the navy’.31 Massey’s sounding machine was promoted to do just this.  
Like work in the dockyard, lead and line sounding at sea required the collective effort 
of the sailors. This made accountability ambiguous. To begin sounding, one sailor (the 
leadsman) moved towards the bow on the outside of the ship, taking with him the lead and 
approximately one fathom of rope. Three or four other sailors took up the rest of the line in 
coils and arranged themselves at intervals along the outside of the ship, from bow to stern 
(Figure 2).32 This arrangement was necessary in order to compensate for the forward motion 
of the ship during sounding. By throwing the lead forwards of the ship, the sailors aimed to 
have the line perpendicular to the seabed when the lead reached the bottom. Only then 
would the sounding be accurate.33 To achieve this, each sailor needed to call to the next 
(‘Watch-ho. Watch.’) in order to provide a warning to prepare to release the next coil of 
line.34 This practice needed to be timed correctly. Releasing the line too early would mean 
missing when the lead hit the seabed; releasing too late could result in getting dragged 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Ashworth, op. cit. (4), pp. 66-67. 
30 Roger Morriss, ‘Government and Community: the Changing Context of Labour Relations, 1770-1830’, in 
Ann Day and Kenneth Lunn (eds), History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards, London: 
Masnell, 1999, pp. 22-30. 
31 Bentham, op. cit. (11), p. 251. 
32 Illustrated in Figure 2 and described in Charles Hutton, A Philosophical and Mathematical Dictionary: Containing an 
Explanation of the Terms, and an Account of the Several Subjects, Comprised under the Heads Mathematics, Astronomy, 
and Philosophy both Natural and Experimental, 2 vols., London: Rivington, 1815, p. 416. 
33 Henry Raper, The Practice of Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, London: Bate, 1840, p. 92. 
34 Hutton, op. cit. (32), p. 416. 
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overboard. But if something went wrong, it was not immediately obvious who was to blame: 
the sailor calling or the sailor listening? Ultimately, it was their collective responsibility to 
ensure the correct amount of line was released as the ship moved forward. This left the 
potential for disgruntled (or incompetent) sailors to disrupt sounding practice without taking 
personal responsibility. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sailors, arranged on the outside of the ship, sounding by lead and line. Eugène Pacini, La 
Marine: Arsenaux, Navires, Équipages, Navigation, Atterages, Combats, Paris: Curmer, 1844, p. 202. 
 
Massey sold his machine as part of a practice which dismantled the collective 
responsibility of the sailors. In one of his pamphlets, forwarded to the Board of Longitude, he 
championed the fact that his machine did not require the coordinated release of line, stating it 
could be operated ‘without any regard to the quantity of line paid out’.35 Other petitioners 
writing to the Board of Longitude adopted a similar strategy. Jennings promoted his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Robert Bill, A Short Account of Massey’s Patent Log, and Sounding Machine, with the Opinions of Several who Have Made 
Trials with Them, London: Blacks & Parry, 1806, p. 4. 
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‘improved log reel’ under the claim that navigational errors arose from practices ‘entrusted to 
several persons’.36 By disassociating the length of line released from the accuracy of sounding, 
Massey hoped to diminish the collective responsibility of the sailors. He reinforced this, 
announcing on the packaging that the measurement relied solely on the ‘revolutions of the 
rotator’.37 This attack on collective responsibility is also suggested in advertisements, one 
stating that lead and line sounding ‘employs a greater number of hands’ and, therefore, is 
more likely to produce ‘a result which could not be depended on.’38 Keen to highlight the 
perceived complications arising from sailors working together, Massey again wrote to the 
Board of Longitude in 1814. Citing the testimony of the Master of HMS Ville de Paris, Massey 
explained that ‘everyone knows the difficulty of passing a line forward and keeping it clear’.39 
To this end, the introduction of Massey’s machine removed the need to coordinate the 
release of the line, the ‘Watch ho. Watch’ call fading into silence.  
The release of line was not the only aspect of lead and line sounding which promoted 
collective responsibility. Once the line was hauled in, the leadsman would either observe or 
feel for the number of knots on the line. Counting these gave him the depth in fathoms (one 
knot per ten fathoms). However, the leadsman did not record the measurement himself but 
rather relayed the depth to an officer on deck in the form of a song, repeating ‘By the mark 
ten’ (for ten fathoms) to which he added ‘and a half ten’ (for ten and a half fathoms).40 
Sounding was particularly important on approach to land during high winds, heavy rain and 
low light. Failure to communicate the correct depth could easily result in wreckage and loss of 
life. The ability to cut across a gale with a distinctive song was critical to successful sounding. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 RGO 14/31, Mr Jennings's Observations Upon the New Invented Log, or Half-Minute Glass, Royal 
Greenwich Observatory Archives. 
37 Instructions pasted to wooden case, Wh.2970. 
38 Advertisement in G. Payne, An Elementary Introduction to The Nautical Almanac, and Astronomical Ephemeris, London: 
Charles Wilson, 1842. 
39 RGO 14/24, Edward Massey to Board of Longitude, 28 September 1814, Royal Greenwich Observatory 
Archives. 
40 Raper, op. cit. (33), p. 91. 
 11 
But, as with the ‘Watch ho. Watch’ call, this made responsibility hard to pin down. The 
leadsman and officer relied on one another to sing and listen respectively, accountability 
drifting away amidst the roar of a storm. 
The introduction of Massey’s machine shifted responsibility solely towards the officer 
on the quarterdeck. Critically, the average leadsman could not be relied upon to read the 
numbered dials on Massey’s machine (Figure 3). This stemmed from his lack of familiarity 
with clocks rather than poor numeracy. The leadsman would have been comfortable working 
with numbers, counting knots in order to report the depth in fathoms to the quarterdeck. 
Studies of eighteenth-century European sailors have also revealed a markedly raised level of 
numeracy amongst the lower deck compared to the general rural population.41 Despite the 
lack of universal education in England at the time, the leadsman’s practical experience in 
counting knots, coupled with tuition from the ship’s chaplain, ensured an adequate level of 
numeracy. 
Counting knots and reading a clock-like dial are, however, very different kinds of 
numeracy. As such, it helps to think of numeracy as a pragmatic property, one heavily 
influenced by the material culture surrounding the use of numbers.42 The typical leadsman 
did not have experience in reading a clock or working with written numbers. Time on board 
ship was regulated via an intricate system of bells, flags and smells.43 Some members of the 
lower deck did own private watches, despite the expense. However, changes in climate and 
location rendered these timepieces highly inaccurate. Owners rarely consulted them. Rather, 
expensive watches simply acted as an easily-portable store of wealth.44 Officers, on the other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Jelle van Lottum and Bo Poulsen, ‘Estimating Levels of Numeracy and Literacy in the Maritime Sector of the 
North Atlantic in the Late Eighteenth Century’, Scandinavian Economic History Review (2011) 59,  pp. 71-74. 
42 As illustrated by Jean Lave, ‘The Values of Quantification’, in John Law (ed.), Power, Action and Belief : A New 
Sociology of Knowledge?, London: Routledge & Paul, 1986. 
43 Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift, Shaping the Day: A History of Timekeeping in England and Wales 1300-1800, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 319. 
44 Glennie and Thrift, op. cit. (43), p. 304. 
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hand, were more likely to be recruited from gentlemanly backgrounds in which the use of 
private timepieces pervaded. 45  Clock-like devices, such as chronometers, also regularly 
featured in their working lives. The numbered dials on Massey’s machine indicate that an 
individual officer would be expected to take responsibility for the accuracy of soundings. In 
fact, in testimonials, a number of officers directly refer to their personal use of the machine. 
Captain John Cummins stationed off the coast of Denmark wrote that, ‘in sailing through the 
Cattegat in from 16 to 25 fathoms water… I could, by myself, get soundings with it’.46 Given 
the North Sea fleet mutinies of the 1790s, this level of individual control no doubt appeared 
desirable. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Byrn, op. cit. (3), p. 91. 
46 Bill, op. cit. (35), pp. 31-32, (italics in original). 
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Figure 3: Dial on Massey’s machine, Wh.2970, Whipple Museum, Cambridge, UK. 
 
In manufacturing a device which favoured the reading of depth by an officer, Massey 
played to the developing emphasis on individual accountability. He even wrote to the Board 
of Longitude in 1806 championing the fact that ‘any man… who can read the hour on the 
dial of a clock, is qualified to read the distance gone.’47 By considering numeracy as a 
pragmatic property, it is clear that ‘any man’ here more readily refers to an officer. Moreover, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 RGO 14/31, Edward Massey to Board of Longitude, 11 September 1806, Royal Greenwich Observatory 
Archives. 
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as the machine could be read by the same officer responsible for recording the depth in the 
ship’s logbook, there was no need for the leadsman’s distinctive song. Works such as 
Christopher Biden’s Naval Discipline later reconfigured singing as a purely recreational rather 
than functional activity.48 In this light, the silence instigated by Massey’s machine takes on 
added significance: it is indicative of an emerging form of discipline in which individual rather 
than collective responsibility is central.  
Back in the dockyards, groups of workers were also learning to keep their mouths 
shut. The Treasonable Practices Act of 1795 had extended the law of treason to print and 
speech, whilst the Seditious Meetings Act banned gatherings of more than 50 people. Shortly 
after the passing of the ‘Two Acts’, an anonymous handbill posted outside Chatham 
Dockyard accurately summed up the situation when it complained they would ‘completely 
deprive the People of the Liberty of speech’.49 It was in this environment that Massey’s 
machine flourished.  
 
Sounding in the dark 
In March 1777, John Aitken, the son of a Scottish tinsmith, was tried and hanged for 
attempting to set fire to Portsmouth Dockyard.50 For the Admiralty, arson represented a 
particularly menacing form of disobedience. Most disturbingly, when committed at night, 
assailants often found it easy to slip away. A report on one such attack on Sheerness 
Dockyard noted that the superintendent had ‘heard a heavy footstep running… but, being 
dark, he could not see any person’.51 Bentham therefore found the Admiralty ready to listen 
when he argued that all dockyard practices should be made visible to a superior officer. With !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Christopher Biden, Naval Discipline: Subordination Contrasted with Insubordination, London: Richardson, 1830, p. 
317. 
49 Phillip MacDougall, ‘The Changing Nature of the Dockyard Dispute, 1790-1840’, in Ann Day and Kenneth 
Lunn (eds), History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards, London: Masnell, 1999, p. 47. 
50 John Wilkes, Encyclopedia Londinensis, London: Adlard, 1825, vol. 20, p. 719. 
51 The Examiner, 11 October 1840, p. 652. 
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this in mind, he created the post of Timber Master in 1801, a single worker charged with 
keeping account of all wood within the dockyard. Crafts could no longer work in relative 
secrecy, taking home wooden ‘chips’ as an informal method of payment.52 What’s more, it 
was with these very chips that radical dockyard workers started the fires, ‘fir shavings and 
birch-brooms cut open’ having been found at the scene in the case of Sheerness.53 Bentham 
hoped that the physical and felt presence of the Timber Master would mitigate both this 
informal payment practice and the risk of arson.54 This regime relied on the visibility of work, 
rather than punishment, as its chief deterrent.55 
At sea, lead and line sounding was antithetical to such a system. By requiring that 
sailors arrange themselves on the outside of the ship, the lead and line method obscured the 
visibility of sounding from the officers: the passing of the line, the passage of the lead and the 
counting of knots all occurred out of sight. In contrast, the engraved numbers on Massey’s 
machine facilitated a transition, one in which the officers’ view of sounding opened up as they 
took on greater individual responsibility. Most immediately, the numbered dials ensured that 
an officer could personally read the depth from the machine, rather than relying on the 
leadsman’s song emanating from out of sight. Massey’s sounding machine was just one of 
many to feature a brass dial or graduated scale in this period. A clockmaker by trade, he 
employed a familiar design when manufacturing his device. The clockmaker Rentzsch also 
opted for a ‘graduated circle’ on his ‘pneumatical chronometer’.56 Rentzsch even developed 
his own dividing engine in order to mark the scale.57 As watchmakers branched out, designs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Carolyn Cooper, ‘The Portsmouth System of Manufacture’, Technology and Culture (1984) 25, p. 194. 
53 John Wilkes, Encyclopedia Londinensis, London: Adlard, 1825, vol. 20, p. 719. 
54 Ashworth, op. cit. (4), p. 74. 
55 Visibility is a central theme in Michel Foucault’s account of disciplinary power, see Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish, London: Vintage, pp. 200-228. 
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Spottiswoode, 1858,  pp. 29-30. 
57 RGO 14/24, Segismund Rentzsch to the Board of Longitude, June 1813, Royal Greenwich Observatory 
Archives. 
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originally developed on land were transferred to the maritime environment: the clock-like 
nature of Massey’s machine, particularly the dials, should be read as one such example. 
Clockmakers were not the only artisans hoping to entice the Board of Longitude in 
this period. Other tradesmen employed a host of alternative designs. In fact, Massey’s major 
competitor approached sounding from a very different perspective. In 1813 Peter Burt, 
operating out of the Commercial Road in East London, presented his ‘buoy and nipper’ 
device to the Board of Longitude (Figure 4).58 The buoy and nipper consisted of a canvas bag 
(the buoy) attached to a spring-loaded wooden pulley block (the nipper). The bag would be 
inflated ‘by blowing with the mouth into the valve’ and trailed behind the ship. The line, with 
a common sounding lead attached, would then be released through the pulley. When the lead 
hit the sea floor, the spring-loaded pulley would ‘nip’ the line, indicating the depth in 
fathoms. In short, the buoy was designed to ensure the lead fell perpendicular to the sea floor 
whilst the pulley helped to ensure the leadsmen did not miss when the lead reached the 
bottom. Although Burt’s own background is unclear from his letters, he was certainly not a 
clockmaker like Massey. In a number of letters he simply refers to himself as a ‘poor man’ 
and, by the 1820s, periodicals describe him as a ‘mathematical instrument maker’.59 The 
design of his device also suggests that Burt had some previous experience in the dockyards, 
perhaps working with pulleys or canvas sails. Although not so successful at soliciting the 
support of the Board of Longitude, Burt’s buoy and nipper was nonetheless widely adopted, 
with over 1400 manufactured and sold between 1813 and 1830.60 
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Figure 4: Peter Burt’s buoy and nipper, detail from Report of the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, 
Showing the Progress of the Survey During the Year Ending November 1, 1857, Washington: Cornelius Wendell, 
1858, plate 70. 
 
Whether sounding with Massey or Burt’s device, the maritime environment mediated 
practice. In particular, lighting on board ship helped to enhance the visibility of practice from 
the perspective of the officers. Massey repeatedly argued that his machine was of great utility 
when sounding in the dark, writing in 1805 that ‘the most inexperienced person may use this 
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machine, without risk of error, in the most turbulent sea, and during the night.’61 Burt made a 
similar claim when writing to the Board of Longitude in 1815, explaining that ‘no light is 
necessary in the night to see the results’.62 Indeed, the value of sounding during night-time 
navigation was well-recognised. However, on closer inspection it is clear that the numbered 
dials on Massey’s machine would have been unreadable in the dark.63 Officers also reported 
‘taking the line to the binnacle light’ in order to inspect the mark made by Burt’s nipper, 
although it was also still possible to haul the device in and count the knots by hand.64 Access 
to light was clearly an important prerequisite for taking readings, particularly in Massey’s 
case. 
The average sailor, such as a leadsman, had extremely limited access to light on board 
ship. Due to social as well as safety concerns, lights were not kept below deck: the risk of fire 
was great and sailors were deemed too irresponsible to carry a lantern. The same rules 
applied in the dockyards. Officers, in contrast, kept lamps in their cabins and on the 
quarterdeck, their increased individual responsibility coupled to exclusive access to lighting.65 
Hence, in a very literal sense, the visibility of Massey’s machine bolstered the individual 
accountability of the officer. In the lead and line method, the leadsman’s lack of access to 
light mattered little: he could simply feel for the number of knots when hauling the line in. In 
contrast, Massey’s machine employed no such tactile method: only an officer could read the 
dial in the dark.66 The spatial nature of lighting further supported such a system of visibility. 
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The position of lanterns meant that, once hauled in, Massey’s machine moved to a position 
on the ship in which only officers presided: the cabin or the quarterdeck. This ensured officers 
took personal responsibility for the depths recorded in the ship’s logbook, an artefact they 
would sign and deliver to the Admiralty on return to Britain. In fact, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, Royal Navy regulations directly identified the captain as responsible for conducting 
soundings ‘whether the Master or Pilot think it necessary or not’.67 
 
Sounding with strength 
Divisions of labour are often thought of in purely economic terms. However, the patterning of 
work served a diversity of ends. In the dockyards, Bentham championed divisions of labour in 
order to establish his broader system of discipline as much as he did to increase production. 
Prior to reform, shipwrights typically converted rough timber into component parts. This 
required a range of abilities from head to hand: muscular strength to saw, dexterity to fashion 
pulley blocks, and theoretical knowledge in order to fit components together. In contrast, 
Bentham stipulated that work should be divided into discrete skills (such as sawing or 
veneering) rather than crafts (such as that of the shipwright). By dividing crafts into analysable 
skills, Bentham could better implement his system of individual accountability and visibility: 
the Timber Master could, in principle, attend to every instance of a skill requiring wood.68 
Alongside the Timber Master, Bentham also introduced a machine for manufacturing pulley 
blocks in Portsmouth Dockyard. The patent, filed in 1793, claimed that the machines 
operated ‘independent in good measure… of attention and altogether of dexterity’. 69 
Similarly, in 1811 the School of Naval Architecture separated the training of dockyard 
officers, both geographically and in terms of content, from the general workforce. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 The Queen’s Regulations and the Admiralty Instructions for the Government of Her Majesty’s Naval Service, London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1862, p. 160. 
68 Ashworth, op. cit. (4), pp. 68-74. 
69 Cooper, op. cit. (52), p. 193. 
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School, in wording akin to both Bentham and Massey’s promotional material, emphasised 
mathematical analysis over the ‘imperfect experience’ of the naval carpenter.70 This division 
of labour, between the mental work of the officers and the physical work of the men, was 
paralleled at sea. However, the maritime environment ensured a distinct set of social and 
technological developments. 
In a letter of March 1811 Massey proudly set out the superiority of his machine on the 
basis that ‘no skill is necessary on the part of the person who takes the soundings’.71 With little 
experience of maritime navigation himself, Massey cited William Nichelson’s Treatise of 
Practical Navigation and Seamanship, arguing that lead and line sounding relied too much upon 
the ‘experience of the man who heaves’.72 Despite Massey’s claims, it is clear that his machine 
did not deskill the practice of sounding.73 Handbooks of nautical surveying soon noted that it 
needed to be used ‘very carefully’ in order to take an accurate reading.74 Burt also mounted a 
forceful attack on this basis, arguing that Massey’s ‘mechanical and complicated’ machine 
was liable to ‘being dashed against the side, either through carelessness in being thrown 
overboard or hauled in’. The buoy and nipper, Burt claimed, was ‘less liable to be put out of 
order’ due to the ‘simplicity of its form and construction’.75 
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In this respect, Burt was right. Bodies were still very much part of the machinery.76 If 
anything, Massey’s machine required more, not less skill to operate. In adopting it, the Royal 
Navy imposed a new set of muscular demands on the leadsman. The accuracy of the machine 
relied on its constant descent through the water. If it was checked before it reached the 
seabed, the locking mechanism would activate and the reading would be incorrect. In order 
to ensure a smooth descent, Massey recommended ‘the lead never be less than 10 or 11 
pounds’ and, where possible, heavier.77 For very deep soundings, officers advocated attaching 
additional leads at intervals along the line as to ensure a smooth passage.78 Whilst the 
machine itself weighed comparatively little, its use required an increase in the weight and 
number of leads the leadsman needed to haul.79 Moreover, the machine had to be thrown so 
as to land perpendicular to the water, requiring further muscular strength and dexterity from 
the leadsman. This ensured the release of the rotor from the locking mechanism, something 
made all the more difficult given the increase in the weights used. These additional muscular 
demands reinforced divisions of labour, cementing the leadsman’s role as a physical worker 
rather than one requiring a broad range of abilities, from singing to counting. By the mid-
nineteenth century one marine magazine referred to sounding as ‘the drudgery of your 
profession’.80 Toil for certain workers, then, was not diminished by Massey’s machine; it was 
one of the consequences.81 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 On the relationship between bodies and instruments, see Kapil Raj, ‘When Human Travellers Become 
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Divisions of labour also served to reform punishment in favour of the developing 
system of discipline. In the old system of hangings and keelhauling, punishment had been an 
endpoint.82 In contrast, the increased toil associated with practices such as sounding turned 
work itself into a form of punishment. Whilst attempting to sail through Hudson Bay in the 
1820s, Captain George Lyon made the following report: 
 
[The] cold was exquisitely painful to men who had been constantly exposed for two days and 
nights to the wash of a freezing sea… sounding with hands nearly raw, every half hour.83 
 
It was -4°C. As the winter progressed, temperatures could drop as low as -30°C. Massey’s 
brass machine would stick to and tear the skin when handled in these conditions.84 The 
removal of rank therefore entailed increased manual labour and physical discomfort, not 
unlike the treadmill found in the prisons.85 Hence work and discipline sustained each other, 
one naval treatise recommending ‘drudgery’ as ‘much more effectual in checking and 
preventing offences, than the infliction of the most severe corporal punishments’.86 
The division of labour also turned discipline into a self-reinforcing system. Dressed in 
distinctive uniforms from 1748 onwards, officers self-consciously adopted mental rather than 
physical work, thus assuming greater individual responsibility for the depths recorded in the 
ship’s logbook.87 In the face of individual scrutiny and fear of demotion, officers were 
particularly eager to ensure accurate readings and so insisted on additional weights during !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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83 George Lyon, A Brief Narrative of an Unsuccessful Attempt to Reach Repulse Bay, London: John Murray, 1825, p. 106. 
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Instrumental Knowledge in British Polar Expedition Narratives, c.1818–1848’, Journal of Historical 
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sounding, Captain Neve of HMS Hibernia writing in 1808 that, ‘with a strong breeze, going 
six knots’, the use of additional weights ‘is in such circumstances necessary’.88 This completed 
the feedback loop, further polarising the division of labour between the physical work of the 
leadsman and the mental work of the officer. From cotton spinning to depth sounding, 
mechanisation embodied practices which both nurtured and relied upon developing social 
structures, such as the division of labour described above.89 In the case of the Royal Navy, 
divisions of labour completed a self-reinforcing system of work-discipline in which individual 
accountability encouraged obedience. 
 
Sounding in motion 
Bentham’s most powerful disciplinary ideal, the panopticon, started life in Russia. In the 
1780s, prior to his appointment with the Royal Navy, Bentham worked for Prince Grigorii 
Potemkin in Krichev. There he managed Potemkin’s rope and textile factories, producing 
materials for the dockyards on the Black Sea. Once back in Britain, the panopticon, with its 
central watchtower and radiating cells, was taken up by Jeremy Bentham as a means to 
reform prison discipline. But despite the support of William Pitt the Younger, the ‘Inspection 
House’ Bentham conceived for an aristocratic estate in Russia did not travel as easily as either 
he or his brother might have hoped.90 The Millbank marshland purchased in 1799 for its 
construction was considered unsuitable whilst political commitment wavered. Bentham’s 
‘model prison’ was never built.91 
Discipline at sea also faced the problem of shifting environments, but on a much 
greater scale. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, both the Royal Navy and the Board !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of Longitude had a truly global remit with theatres ranging from the Mediterranean to the 
Pacific. Institutions on land, often thousands of miles from the day-to-day practices taking 
place aboard ship, found it difficult to maintain order and administer justice. 92 The changing 
circumstances associated with travel also challenged obedience: for instance, court martials 
cited climate and ease of access to Caribbean rum as causes of lawlessness in the Lesser 
Antilles.93 The developing system of discipline needed to be maintained in the face of global 
travel. 
 With respect to lead and line sounding, travel could often induce changes in practice 
detrimental to discipline. Massey identified many of these issues in his publications. For 
example, faced with the difficulty of sounding in certain locations, such as on approach to a 
lee shore or in regions with strong currents, ships often continued ‘without sounding at all’.94 
The loss of vessels due to negligent navigation presented a serious challenge for the Royal 
Navy at the time, with eighteen ships of the West Indies fleet lost to shipwreck between 1784 
and 1812.95 Furthermore, in his petitions to the Board of Longitude, Massey identified 
variability in practice as a significant obstacle to navigation, his pamphlets and advertisements 
claiming that the ‘difference of method and caprice in those who use them’ rendered 
consultation of charts useless.96 In high winds, for instance, the lead would often be thrown 
from the windward side of the ship, passed round the stern, and hauled from the leeward side. 
This technique attempted to compensate for the movement of the ship without requiring the 
sails be lowered. In contrast, a thick fog almost always necessitated the lowering of the sails 
before sounding.97 Each practice, offsetting errors in different ways, introduced its own 
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discrepancy between the depth measured and the chart to be consulted. Specific geographies 
tied each problem to travel, the East Indies distinguished by strong currents, the Irish Sea 
characterised by high winds, and the North Sea prone to heavy fog.98 
Massey also linked variability directly to discipline in one advertisement. A 
hypothetical scenario is given in which a captain faces court martial for the loss of a ship due 
to ‘an error in sounding’. The variable nature of lead and line is portrayed as inhibiting 
justice, the slippery captain absolved of responsibility. Massey’s machine, in contrast, is 
introduced as ensuring the captain takes individual responsibility for careful navigation. 
There is to be no excuse for error when furnished with his machine.99 Critically, Massey 
presents his sounding machine as providing a universal standard: ‘though some of the 
machines answered their purposes tolerably well under certain circumstances, none of them 
were nearly correct under all circumstances’.100 The search for measurements abstracted 
from geographic setting is a pervasive theme in the history of instrumentation, especially 
navigation.101 In 1813 Rentzsch wrote to the Board of Longitude promoting his ‘pneumatical 
chronometer’ once again, this time under the assertion of it ‘not being liable to variation  
from change of temperature’. Similarly, Grimaldi wrote to the Board of Longitude in 1812 
requesting a reward for developing a chronometer without a mainspring, allowing it to 
operate ‘in all climates… nearly the same’.102 
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These were all problems that the Board of Longitude itself was familiar with, 
particularly having arranged trials of John Harrison’s timekeeper in the 1760s. 103  But 
Massey’s advertisement reveals the diversity of motivations behind such an enterprise. In this 
case, mechanised attempts to standardise sounding facilitated the system of discipline 
developing within the Royal Navy. Individual accountability could only be enforced if, 
irrespective of locality, the charts available to the officers corresponded to the depths 
measured. By abstracting sounding practice from locality, Massey’s machine offered greater 
visibility to the court martials. They no longer needed to reconstruct the specifics of practice 
aboard a particular vessel. Rather, it could be assumed that charts accorded with the 
information available to the captain, acting as a window onto calamities in far-flung places. 
By 1862, Royal Navy regulations listed the production of the ship’s logbook and charts as a 
necessary precondition for conducting a court martial, going on to identify how each should 
be compared.104 Indeed, these regulations were pre-empted by Lord Gambier’s 1809 court 
martial in which the logbook of HMS Imperieuse along with her charts were presented as 
evidence.105 Massey’s machine reinforced this shift. With an apparently universal standard in 
place, negligence, such as sailing too close to a lee shore, or cowardice, such as failing to 
follow up an attack, could be identified back on land post-hoc. 
Despite Massey’s apparent success, the uptake of his machine did not go 
unchallenged. Burt continued to lobby the Board of Longitude for a reward of his own, 
promoting his ‘simple and very useful instrument’.106 In making this argument, Burt tried to 
undermine the claim that Massey’s sounding machine operated faultlessly in every maritime 
environment. Burt pointed out that ‘striking the bottom on foul rocky ground might much !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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injure it, if not render it totally useless’.107 This is a problem Massey’s son later encountered 
himself when conducting a trial in the Irish Sea. On hauling in the line aboard HMS Trinculo, 
the leadsman reported that the machine had been lost.108 Other navigators also found the 
central brass cylinder often buckled when striking the sea bed or under high pressure.109 Burt 
even claimed that the Navy Board had been forced to pay Massey over £1000 for repairs and 
replacements. 110  Getting an instrument to operate in different maritime environments 
therefore also meant considering its upkeep: chronometers required constant tinkering whilst 
even sextants were liable to jam. The expertise required to repair such precision instruments 
proved difficult to come by once aboard a ship half way across the Atlantic.111 Burt paid 
particular attention to this problem, in contrast to Massey, writing that his buoy and nipper 
‘may be repaired on board or in a distant country by the common mechanic’.112 It was the 
‘simplicity’ of his design, Burt argued, that rendered it serviceable in climates ranging from 
the ‘British Channel’ to the ‘North Coasts of Java’.113 
Massey and Burt ultimately represent two alternative solutions to the problem of 
abstracting measurement from the environment. Captain Hawtayne aboard HMS Florida 
identified as much when he wrote that the two devices ‘bear no sort of analogy to each other’ 
and, consequently, he found it ‘difficult to declare a preference’.114 Massey believed that the 
problem required increased mechanical intervention, modelling his device on a clock. In 
contrast, Burt believed that the solution required an instrument of ‘great simplicity’. Massey 
and Burt, both newcomers to the nautical instrument trade, clashed, not just because they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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represented distinct crafts, but also because they placed differing emphasis on mechanisation. 
For historians of instrumentation, it is therefore all the more telling to learn how sailors 
themselves dealt with this problem. In May 1816 Captain Hawtayne reported that his crew 
found Burt’s buoy and nipper most accurate in ‘shallow water when running fast’, whilst 
Massey’s device was preferred in deep waters.115 Despite the best efforts of Massey and Burt, 
sailors favoured different solutions in different circumstances.116 Testimonials from numerous 
navigators also confirm that both devices were regularly found aboard the same vessel.117 A 
different environment always demanded a different machine.  
 
Conclusion 
Edward Massey was just one of a range of new entrants into the scientific and nautical 
instrument trade in this period. Inspired by a variety of crafts, from watchmaking to 
glasswork, these artisans reimagined some of the most basic navigational tools, from the 
sounding lead to the compass. The Board of Longitude, particularly from the late eighteenth 
century onwards, acted as an intermediary, assessing designs and commissioning trials at sea. 
With the First Lord of the Admiralty present at the majority of meetings, disciplinary reform 
proved a powerful ideology. The Board of Longitude favoured instruments which, like 
Massey’s, facilitated the development of a new disciplinary routine, one based around 
individual accountability, visibility and divisions of labour. But between the dockyards and 
the ocean, changing maritime environments allowed a variety of disciplinary and navigational 
practices to flourish. Long voyages to the Pacific, for example, imposed very different kinds of 
power relations to those found aboard ships stationed in the Atlantic. This was something !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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both Captain William Bligh and the Board of Longitude learned the hard way when the crew 
of HMS Bounty mutinied after leaving Tahiti, taking the ship’s chronometer with them.118 In 
contrast, the new system of discipline was to operate irrespective of locality, whether in a 
London dockyard or traversing the Northwest Passage. It was precisely this tripartite concern 
over the relationship between discipline, instrumentation and travel which motivated Massey 
and his supporters within the Royal Navy. With this in mind, we are in a better position to 
account for Massey’s relative success. His machine worked, in the broad sense, because it took 
on a dual role: it was both an instrument and a disciplinary tool. In the maritime 
environment, discipline enabled travel but travel also motivated new approaches to discipline. 
Massey’s machine served both ends. 
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